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INTRODUCTION 
 In just over a year, Jones “loaned” himself his then 90-year-old, 
demented father’s (David) entire retirement income (nearly $60,000 total) and 
ran up another $19,000 in charges on his father’s credit card to pay for Jones’s 
living expenses and his two failed restaurants, all while he refused to pay his 
father’s assisted-living facility, medical care, prescriptions, or personal items 
such as a haircut or bed pads. When the assisted-living facility demanded 
payment, and threatened eviction, Jones brushed them off. He said that his 
father (who at this point could no longer identify a lion or a rhinoceros) 
would have wanted Jones to spend all the money on his failed restaurants. A 
-2- 
jury disagreed and convicted Jones of exploitation of a vulnerable adult and 
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary—both second-degree felonies.  
Ineffective Assistance claims 
 “Expert” testimony. Two witnesses testified that David lacked capacity 
to read or understand complicated financial documents. According to Jones, 
these were “expert” opinions and his counsel should have objected. But these 
testimonies were based on the witnesses’ personal observations of David and 
reasonable counsel could conclude that they were lay opinions or that any 
objection to their qualifications would have been unlikely to succeed (as both 
witnesses had advanced degrees and extensive experience in working with 
cognitively-impaired adults). In any event, the evidence of David’s incapacity 
was overwhelming, so there would have been no reasonable probability of a 
different outcome if the testimony from these witnesses had been excluded.   
 404(b) evidence. In discovery, the prosecution did not give notice that it 
would offer 404(b) evidence. At trial, it introduced a lease agreement for one 
of Jones’s restaurants and a document showing several loans made to Jones. 
Jones says that these documents are 404(b) evidence and his counsel should 
have objected on lack-of-notice grounds. But reasonable counsel could 
conclude that the documents were not proof of a “crime, wrong, or other act,” 
or were intrinsic to Jones’s charged crimes, and thus not subject to 404(b) and 
-3- 
its notice provisions. Reasonable counsel could also conclude that these 
documents helped Jones by lending support to his defense that his father had 
loaned him money in the past and wanted to see the restaurant succeed. In 
any event, neither document prejudiced Jones as both supported his defense 
and the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. 
 Jury instruction. According to Jones, the unlawful dealing statute 
requires a knowing mental state for the substantial-risk-of-loss element and 
his counsel was ineffective for not requesting such an instruction. But 
reasonable counsel could conclude that the knowing mental state applied 
only to the violation-of-duty element, not the substantial-risk-of-loss element. 
At least, there was no controlling law to alert counsel otherwise. In any event, 
the evidence that Jones knew his actions involved a substantial risk of loss 
was overwhelming. So there is no reasonable probability that the outcome 
would have been different with Jones’s requested instruction. 
 Merger. Jones says that his counsel was ineffective for not asking to 
merge his exploitation of a vulnerable adult count with his unlawful dealing 
of property by a fiduciary count because the two crimes are lesser-included 
offenses of each other. But exploitation requires an element not found in 
unlawful dealing: a vulnerable adult. And unlawful dealing requires an 
element not found in exploitation: a fiduciary.   
-4- 
Other claims 
 Jones makes two other claims. First, he says that the terms “unjust[]” 
and “improper[]” in the exploitation statute are unconstitutionally vague. But 
any person of ordinary intelligence would understand that taking all your 90-
year-old, demented, father’s income (roughly $6,500 a month, including 
$900/month from his father’s long-term care insurance policy) to pay for 
your living expenses and failed restaurants, while refusing to pay your 
father’s rent, care, prescriptions, or basic personal needs is unjust and 
improper and thus proscribed by the statue. So the statute, as applied to 
Jones, is not vague and he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
it as applied to the hypothetical conduct of others. 
 Second, Jones argues that there is insufficient evidence of intent. But 
this issue fails for procedural reasons: it is not preserved, and Jones fails to 
argue plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. It also fails on its merits. 
At best, Jones shows a dispute in the evidence. But disputed evidence does 
not equal insufficient evidence; that is especially true when the evidence on 




STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1.  Was Jones’s trial counsel ineffective for: 
 (a) not objecting to “expert” opinions; 
 (b) not objecting to alleged 404(b) evidence on lack-of-notice grounds; 
 (c) not objecting to the jury instruction for unlawful dealing; 
 (d) not moving to merge his unlawful dealing of property by a 
fiduciary conviction with exploitation of a vulnerable adult conviction?  
 Standard of Review. When a defendant argues ineffective assistance of 
counsel for the first time on appeal, there is no ruling for an appellate court 
to review. The issue therefore presents a question of law. State v. Ott, 2010 
UT 1, ¶16, 247 P.3d 344. 
 2.  Is the exploitation of a vulnerable adult statute unconstitutionally 
vague? 
 Standard of Review. Constitutional questions are questions of law, but 
statutes are presumed constitutional and an appellant must prove 
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 
1009 (Utah 1995); see also Stone v. Department of Registration, 567 P.2d 1115 
(Utah 1977) (“[I]t is not within the province of the courts to . . . declare a 
statute unconstitutional unless it is determined to be so beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”). 
-6- 
 3a.  Is Jones insufficient evidence argument preserved? And if not, 
should the Court disregard it because Jones argues no exception to the 
preservation rule? 
 Standard of Review. None applies. 
 3b.  Was there sufficient evidence to convict Jones of unlawful dealing 
of property by a fiduciary and exploitation of a vulnerable adult? 
 Standard of Review. A trial court’s decision to submit a case to the jury 
is reviewed for correctness, with the ultimate ruling turning on a highly 
deferential view of the jury’s role as fact-finder. See State v. Hummel, 2017 UT 
19, ¶87, 393 P.3d 314; State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶21, 345 P.3d 1168. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts. 
David’s declining health 
 Jones’s father, David, volunteered during World War II where he flew 
B25 bombers. R597. His service launched his career. Fascinated by airplanes, 
he obtained degrees in civil and aeronautical engineering and later worked 
for the Air Force, Lockheed, and Boeing in locations that included Greece and 
Saudi Arabia. R598.  
 As David aged, his mental health declined. His younger brother, Ken, 
first noticed it around 2005. R599–600. At that time, David was 81 years old. 
-7- 
R805, 851. During a visit that year, David did not recognize Ken and was 
“noticeably disoriented.” R600. In later phone calls, David didn’t know who 
he was talking with and “wasn’t entirely with it.” Id.  
 Five years later, at age 86, David signed a power of attorney that gave 
his only child, Jones, broad authority, including control of David’s finances 
and health-related decisions. R805–06, SE24. At this point, Jones admitted his 
father was already exhibiting signs of dementia. R808. The power of attorney 
gave Jones power, among other things, to contract for his father’s medical 
care and pay reasonable compensation for it. R834, SE24. It also required 
Jones to act in his father’s best interest, which Jones understood. R834, SE24.  
 Two years later, at age 88, Jones said his father was “incompetent,” or 
at least arguably so, due to his “progressive dementia.” R835–36, 838, 839–
840, SE23.  
Brewhaha 
 A year later, Jones pushed ahead with his plans to open a restaurant, 
Brewhaha. R804. According to Jones, he and his father were business partners 
and the restaurant was something both wanted. Id. Jones found a Sugarhouse 
property, and although the proposed lease was “incredibly unfair” with 
“harsh provisions,” and even though the prior tenant warned him about the 
landlord and Jones called the landlord a “real snake” and a “horrible person” 
-8- 
Jones chose to sign it. R807, 836. The landlord insisted that David sign the 
lease too as a tenant and a personal guarantor. R836–37. So Jones, despite 
David’s incompetence, had him sign. R836, 838–40, SE23.  
  While Jones said that his father was his “partner,” his father had no 
ownership in the restaurant despite contributing most of the money. R735–
36, 811, 838.  
David is admitted to Highland Cove 
 Six months later, while alone at his St. George home, David became 
dehydrated and disoriented. R812. Some friends took him to the hospital. 
R812. After three nights, and twenty days of rehabilitation, it was determined 
that David could no longer live on his own. Id.   
 Jones arranged for his father to move to Highland Cove, an assisted 
living facility. R813. He filled out the admission paperwork where he noted 
that David suffered from “progressive dementia.” R516, 536, SE1. He then 
signed an agreement to pay $3,000 a month for David’s rent and care. SE2. 
This amount did not include other personal expenses such as medications, a 
haircut, toothpaste, and the like. R523, SE3.  
 Cody Tower, Highland Cove’s manager, interacted with David daily. 
R534. Tower said that David’s dementia was “obvious.” R536. As an example, 
David stopped by Tower’s office on his first day and “was having difficulty 
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finding words for what he was trying to say.” R535. Tower followed David 
back to his room where David pointed at his pants pocket. Id. Eventually, 
Tower learned that David had lost his wallet, but David had been unable to 
express that in words. Id. 
 There were other signs too. David struggled to answer basic questions 
(R558–59), or to converse beyond an exchange of the most basic pleasantries, 
such as “hello” and “how are you” (R536, 538), and could no longer make his 
own food or bathe or dress himself. R557. 
The Loan Document 
 Three weeks after admission to Highland Cove, Jones had his father 
sign a document authorizing Jones to loan himself money from his father’s 
retirement income (Loan Document). SE16. The loan could be for business or 
personal use and there was “no limit” on the amount so long as David’s 
physical and medical needs were met. Id. The Loan Document required Jones 
to keep records of each loan and to pay five-percent interest. Id.  
Jones “loans” himself David’s retirement income 
 David made good money in retirement. He had a civil service pension, 
social security, retirement from Boeing, and a long-term care policy designed 
to pay for David’s stay at a facility like Highland Cove. R584, 660–61. These 
-10- 
sources totaled $6,500 a month, more than double what was needed to pay 
Highland Cove. R661–62. 
 Each month after securing the Loan Document, Jones “loaned” himself 
his father’s retirement income (including his father’s long-term care 
insurance) to pay for Brewhaha’s renovation and operation. R820, 824–25, 
853. Also, as Jones did not have income of his own, he “loaned” himself 
money to pay for his living expenses. R810. Jones kept no record of these 
loans. R846–48.  
Jones fails to pay Highland Cove 
 These “loans” left no money to pay for his father’s care. Jones missed 
payments to Highland Cove in December, January, February, and March as 
David’s account balance ballooned to $14,967.97. R521, SE3. He also failed to 
pay for his father’s prescriptions or basic hygiene items like a toothbrush, a 
haircut, or bed pads. R523, 543, 573, SE3.  
 Highland Cove sent monthly bills and statements to Jones. R518–19, 
556, SE3. It also called, left voicemails, and spoke with him in person about 
the need to pay for his father’s care. R522, 541–42. Jones explained that he had 
started a restaurant, Brewhaha, and was having cash flow problems. R546, 
552, 820, 824. Each time, Jones promised that payment would be forthcoming. 
-11- 
R542. At no point did Highland Cove agree to let Jones miss payments. R548–
49, 553. 
 Tired of the promises of payment, Highland Cove sent Jones an 
eviction notice. R543–44, SE4. It said that it had “reached out to [Jones] to 
make arrangements to get [his father’s] account brought to a current status,” 
had assisted him in making claims on his father’s long-term care policy, and 
had been “lenient” with late fees. SE4. But it could do so no longer. Id. It 
demanded that Jones either bring his father’s account current or vacate the 
apartment within 30 days. Id. 
 Jones ignored the notice. He didn’t vacate or make payments; in fact, 
he missed two more (May and June). R544, SE3.1  
 This put Highland Cove in a difficult spot. It could not kick out a 90-
year-old, demented man with no ability to care for himself. R544–45. In these 
situations, Highland Cove typically works with the State to try and get David 
financial assistance to either stay at Highland Cove or go to another facility. 
Id.  
                                              
1  A $3,000 payment was made in April, but Jones said that he never 
made that payment and believed it was an accounting error. R819–20. 
-12- 
Brewhaha fails, Jones starts another restaurant 
 About the same time as the eviction notice, Brewhaha’s landlord filed 
suit against Jones, David, and Foothill Management, Jones’s LLC. SE23. Jones 
was more than $10,000 behind in rent and had ignored the landlord’s request 
to vacate the property. Id.  
 In this action, Jones filed a pro se motion to dismiss his father. SE23. He 
alleged that his father was under “24-hour a day supervision for progressive 
dementia, for which he has been suffering for several years,” since at least 
2012 (which was a year before he had his father sign the Loan Document), 
“and was not competent to sign either [the] lease or the personal guarantee.” 
R839–40, SE23; see SE16 (showing Loan Document signed in November 2013). 
“Due to his condition,” Jones continued, “[his father] has no knowledge or 
comprehension of the eviction . . . and has no competence to participate in 
this case.” Id.  
 The lawsuit resulted in a six-figure judgment against Jones. R807. 
 Undeterred by Brewhaha’s failure, the lawsuit, judgment, or Highland 
Cove’s eviction notice, Jones opened another restaurant, Gusto. R765, 822–23, 
851–53. Like Brewhaha, Jones used his father’s retirement to fund Gusto. 
R824–25, 851, 853. Like Brewhaha, his father was not listed as an owner of 
Gusto. R735. And, again like Brewhaha, Gusto failed within months. R826. 
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Protective Services investigates 
 When Ken, David’s younger brother, learned about the eviction notice, 
he was suspicious; he knew David’s retirement was more than enough to pay 
Highland Cove. R605–07. So he reported his suspicions to Tower; and Tower 
(and later Ken) contacted Adult Protective Services (Protective Services). 
R546–47, 605–07. 
 When Protective Services first met David, it found that he couldn’t 
remember his age, birthday, siblings’ names, where he had worked, where 
he had banked, how much money he made, or how to call 911. R669. When 
Protective Services asked for a phone number, David brought them a 
fingernail kit. Id. When David took a phone call during the meeting, he looked 
confused, and when he hung up, he could not remember who he was talking 
to or what the conversation was about. R668–69, 675–77.  
 Jones admitted to Protective Services that he had used his father’s 
retirement income but said he had his father’s blessing to use “whatever 
money he wanted to.” R672. When confronted with Highland Cove’s unpaid 
bills, Jones said that Highland Cove let him “get away with it”—that is, they 
-14- 
had agreed to let him defer payments until Brewhaha was turning a profit—
the same stories that Jones would later peddle at trial. R671–72, 688, 818–19. 
 Protective Services’ investigation found that from October 2013 (when 
David was admitted to Highland Cove) to October 2014 (when the Office of 
Public Guardian took over as David’s guardian, see infra) David made $76,000 
from his retirement income. R661–62. During that time, Jones made just four 
payments to Highland Cove, totaling about $12,000. R662, SE3. Leaving more 
than $60,000 that Jones spent on the restaurant or himself. R677–78, 742, 830–
33.  
The Public Guardian takes over 
 The Office of Public Guardian (Public Guardian) took over as David’s 
guardian in October 2014. R567. From there on, David’s care at Highland 
Cove was paid each month and within a year it had paid in full the more than 
$27,000 David owed for unpaid care. R572, 588–89. With his account current, 
Ken, David’s younger brother took over as guardian. R589, 607. 
Jones runs up charges on David’s credit card 
 As Protective Services investigated and the Public Guardian took over, 
Jones spent his father’s money even faster. In mid-October, he opened a new 
credit card in his father’s name. R663, 729–30, SE25–26. He then transferred 
around $5,000 from an old credit card (again in his father’s name) to the new 
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card and closed the old one. Id. Then, in three weeks, he spent another $14,000 
on the new credit card. Id. Some of these expenses were for the restaurant, 
but some were personal with charges to places like Snowbird, a dentist office, 
the DMV, cable television, and gas stations. SE26. Jones later called the Public 
Guardian and asked why it was not paying off this credit card. R571–72. 
David fails the MoCA test 
 Shortly after the Public Guardian took over, David’s geriatric nurse 
performed a MoCA test—the Montreal Cognitive Assessment—which is the 
favored screening tool for dementia. R692, 694, 702. When she walked into 
the room, David was standing, holding the phone, and listening to the dial 
tone. R698–99. In the test, David couldn’t identify a lion or a rhinoceros, 
repeat sentences, repeat simple one- or two-syllable words like “face” or 
“church”, answer simple math questions, recognize letters in the alphabet. 
R704–05. David scored zero out of a possible thirty points on the MoCA test. 
R707. 
Jones tries to retake control of his father’s income 
 When the Public Guardian took over, Jones lost access to his father’s 
money. Just ten days after David failed the MoCA test, Jones drafted three 
documents (Financial Control Documents), took them to David, and had him 
sign them. R827–28, SE17–19. These documents directed David’s retirement 
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income to be deposited into Jones’s personal accounts, authorized Jones to 
manage David’s retirement accounts and to make loans to himself, and 
changed the accounts’ contact information from David’s to Jones’s. SE17–19. 
Each concluded by stating that David did not “recognize the authority of any 
person, institution, or Agency that attempts to change these directions.” Id. 
 Jones admitted that the Financial Control Documents’ purpose was to 
“try to keep the state and the state guardian from getting [his father’s] 
money.” R844–45. 
 At a Protective Services’ hearing a month later, Jones testified that his 
father was “cogent” when he signed these documents and “definitely has the 
capacity on a day-to-day basis to make decisions about who controls his 
finance [sic] and where his money goes . . . and the conduct of his life.” R672, 
675–76. This directly contradicted the representations Jones made several 
months earlier when he argued that David should be dismissed from the 
lawsuit because of his progressive dementia. SE23. 
Jones files for bankruptcy 
 Jones eventually filed for personal bankruptcy. R852. There Jones not 
only discharged the six-figure judgment, but he also discharged any of the 
“loans” he made to himself from David’s retirement income. Id.  
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B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
 The State charged Jones with exploitation of a vulnerable adult and 
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, both second-degree felonies. 
R319.  
Pretrial motions 
 Before trial, Jones moved to declare the exploitation statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(iii) unconstitutional because the words “unjust” and 
“improper” were too vague. R174–84. The trial court deferred ruling on this 
motion until after the trial, where it denied the motion. R950–56. 
 Jones also asked the court to exclude any 404(b) evidence because the 
prosecution had not provided notice of such evidence despite his discovery 
requests. R362–81. Specifically, Jones asked the court to exclude “evidence 
that he used [his father’s] credit cards.” R366–67. Jones acknowledged that he 
had received the credit card evidence but protested that he “wasn’t aware 
until recently that [the prosecution] planned on introducing it as part of the 
criminal event.” R368–69. The prosecution responded that the credit card 
evidence was part of its case-in-chief, not 404(b) evidence. R369–71. 
 The court ruled that any evidence that “is relevant to what’s charged 
in the information” would be admissible. R375. But if it was “evidence of 
other bad acts outside of the scope of what’s charged in the information, then 
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[it would] hear an argument that it’s not admissible because [the prosecution] 
didn’t give the 404(b) notice.” Id. 
Motion for a Directed Verdict 
 At the close of the prosecution’s case, Jones moved for a directed 
verdict for insufficient evidence. R753. When asked if he “want[ed] to make 
an argument” on that point, Jones declined, and the trial court denied it. Id. 
Disposition and appeal 
 The jury convicted Jones of one count each of unlawful dealing of 
property by a fiduciary and exploitation of a vulnerable adult, both second-
degree felonies. R252–53. The court sentenced Jones to 1-to-15 years in prison 
on each count and ordered them to run concurrently. R325. It then suspended 
the prison term, sentenced Jones to 180 days in jail for his exploitation charge 
and placed him on AP&P-supervised probation for 36 months. Id.  
 Jones now appeals. R328. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Point 1.A: Two witnesses testified that David lacked capacity to read 
or understand complicated financial documents. According to Jones, these 
were “expert” opinions and his counsel should have objected. But these 
testimonies were based on the witnesses’ personal observations of David and 
reasonable counsel could conclude that they were lay opinions or that any 
-19- 
objection to their qualifications would have been unlikely to succeed (as both 
witnesses had advanced degrees and extensive experience in working with 
cognitively-impaired adults). In any event, the evidence of David’s incapacity 
was overwhelming, so there is no reasonable probability of a different 
outcome even if these “expert” opinions had been excluded.     
 Point I.B: In discovery, the prosecution did not give notice of 404(b) 
that it intended to offer 404(b) evidence. At trial, it introduced a lease 
agreement for one of Jones’s restaurants and a document showing several 
loans made to Jones. Jones says that these documents are 404(b) evidence and 
his counsel should have objected on lack-of-notice grounds. But reasonable 
counsel could conclude that the documents were not proof of a “crime, 
wrong, or other act,” or were intrinsic to Jones’s charged crimes, and thus not 
subject to 404(b) and its notice provisions. Reasonable counsel could also 
conclude that these documents supported his defense that his father had 
loaned him money before his progressive dementia and wanted to see the 
restaurant succeed. In any event, neither document prejudiced Jones as both 
helped his defense and the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming.   
 Point I.C: According to Jones, the unlawful dealing statute requires a 
knowing mental state for the substantial-risk-of-loss element and his counsel 
was ineffective for not requesting such an instruction. But reasonable counsel 
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could conclude that the knowing mental state applied only to the violation-
of-duty element, not the substantial-risk-of-loss element. Jones cites no 
controlling authority available to counsel that would have alerted him 
otherwise. In any event, the evidence that Jones knew his actions involved a 
substantial risk of loss was overwhelming. So there is no reasonable 
probability that the outcome would have been different with Jones’s 
requested instruction.   
 Point I.D: Jones says that his counsel was ineffective for not asking to 
merge his exploitation of a vulnerable adult count with his unlawful dealing 
of property by a fiduciary count because the two crimes are lesser-included 
offenses of each other. But exploitation requires an element not found in 
unlawful dealing: a vulnerable adult. And unlawful dealing requires an 
element not found in exploitation: a fiduciary.    
 Point II: Jones says that the terms “unjust[]” and “improper[]” in the 
exploitation statute are unconstitutionally vague. But any person of ordinary 
intelligence would understand that taking all your 90-year-old, demented, 
father’s income (roughly $6,500 a month, including $900/month from his 
father’s long-term care insurance policy) to pay for your living expenses and 
failed restaurants, while refusing to pay your father’s rent, care, 
prescriptions, or basic personal needs is unjust and improper and thus 
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proscribed by the statue. So the statute, as applied to Jones, is not vague and 
he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of it as applied to the 
hypothetical conduct of others.   
 Point III: Jones argues that there is insufficient evidence of intent. But 
this issue fails for procedural reasons: it is not preserved, and Jones fails to 
argue plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. It also fails on its merits. 
At best, Jones shows a dispute in the evidence. But disputed evidence does 
not equal insufficient evidence; that is especially true when the evidence on 
the guilty side of the dispute is overwhelming, as it is here.   
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Jones’s counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. 
 Jones alleges that his counsel was ineffective because he: (1) did not 
object to unnoticed testimony that he says was expert testimony; (2) did not 
object to unnoticed evidence that he says was 404(b) evidence; (3) stipulated 
to a jury instruction that tracked the statutory language; and (4) did not ask 
to merge Jones’s convictions, each of which included an element that the 
other did not.2 Jones also alleges cumulative error.  
                                              
2  Jones’s first three ineffectiveness claims are found in section I of his 
brief; his fourth is found in section IV. For ease of reference, all four of his 
ineffectiveness claims are joined in a single section.  
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 Claims of ineffective assistance place a “heavy burden” on appellants 
like Jones. State v. J.A.L., 2011 UT 27, ¶25, 262 P.3d 1. To prevail, he must 
prove both (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that he 
was prejudiced by it. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984). 
 Establishing deficient performance requires proof that no reasonable 
attorney would have done what counsel did. Id. at 687–88. To “eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight,” reasonableness is evaluated from “counsel’s 
perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. It is also viewed under “prevailing 
professional norms,” rather than “best practices” or “common custom.” 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (cleaned up. And it is reviewed 
in light of the controlling law available to counsel. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). Review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential 
because unlike the reviewing court, counsel “observed the relevant 
proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the 
client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.” Id. So there are “countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case” and even “the best 
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same 
way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
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These principles distill to this: a defendant claiming deficient 
performance must prove that “no competent attorney” would have 
proceeded as his counsel did.  Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011). 
 Establishing prejudice requires the defendant to show that “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A 
reasonable probability is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect 
on the outcome of the proceeding.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104 (cleaned up). 
Rather, “[c]ounsel’s errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. (cleaned up). Proof of prejudice 
must be based on a “demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter.” State 
v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (cleaned up)). 
 Here, Jones fails to prove either required element for each of his four 
ineffective assistance claims. The failure to prove one is fatal. 
A. Counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to Tower’s or 
Mack’s “expert” opinions.  
 Based on their personal observations, Cody Tower (Highland Cove’s 
general manager) and Kimberly Mack (an investigator with Protective 
Services) opined that Jones’s 93-year-old demented father, based on their 
personal observations, was incapable of understanding complicated financial 
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documents. According to Jones, these are expert opinions and his counsel 
should have objected to them because (1) the prosecution did not give expert-
testimony notice as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (West 2018) 
and (2) the prosecution had neither (a) qualified them as experts nor (b) 
established the reliability of their opinions. Aplt.Brf.15–21. 
 This claim fails for several reasons. First, Tower’s and Mack’s opinions 
were no so clearly expert testimony that all competent counsel would have 
recognized it as such. Second, even if they would have, reasonable counsel 
could conclude that Tower and Mack were qualified and any objection would 
have been futile. And, as far as the notice objection, it would have resulted 
only in a continuance and reasonable counsel could conclude a continuance 
was unnecessary. Finally, even if all competent counsel would have objected, 
Jones cannot prove prejudice where Tower’s and Mack’s testimonies were 
cumulative of much stronger evidence of David’s poor mental state.   
1. Reasonable counsel could conclude that Tower and Mack 
gave lay opinions, not expert ones. 
 The test for determining if Tower’s or Mack’s opinions are lay or expert 
is “whether [their] testimony require[d] [them to] have scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge.” State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶¶11, 34, 
147 P.3d 1176. Stated another way, if “an average bystander would be able to 
-25- 
provide [their] same testimony,” then it is lay opinion testimony and the State 
was not required to provide notice or qualify them as experts. Id. ¶34. 
 But the question is not simply whether Tower’s or Mack’s opinions are 
lay or expert. Jones’s claim is one for ineffective assistance. So the focus is not 
on the merits of the objection. Rather, the issue is whether Tower’s and 
Mack’s opinions were so clearly expert opinions that all competent defense 
attorneys would have recognized it as such. Here, the answer here is no. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.3 
a. Tower’s testimony.  
 Tower saw David every day from the time he was admitted to 
Highland Cove. R533–34. Tower testified that David struggled to 
communicate with others (as an example, on David’s first day at the facility 
he could not communicate that he had lost his wallet); could not understand 
most questions beyond basic pleasantries like “hello[]” or “how are you”; was 
                                              
3  Jones tries to change the question. He says deficient performance is 
about strategy, not reasonableness. Aplt.Brf.18. According to him, if there 
was no reasonable strategy behind failing to object, then his counsel’s 
performance is deficient. Id. This formulation of deficient performance has 
some support in Utah case law. See State v. Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶37 
n.7, 414 P.3d 559. But the United States Supreme Court has rejected it: “The 
relevant question is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they 




unable to take care of his day-to-day needs like food, clothing, and grooming 
without prompts or cues from others; and could not make his own decisions 
without “direction from other people.” R533–34, 536, 538, 557, 559.  
 After David had been at Highland Cove for three weeks, Jones had 
David sign the Loan Document authorizing Jones to “borrow funds, on a 
periodic basis,” with “no limit,” from any or all of [David’s] retirement 
accounts . . . for business or personal use as [Jones] deems necessary.” SE16. 
None of this, of course, is opinion testimony at all, only observations of 
someone experienced in dealing with cognitively-impaired adults.  
 The State asked Tower, based on his interactions, if David could read 
and comprehend the Loan Document. R539.4 Tower opined, “[A]s I know 
David and the complexity of what is written [in the Loan Document], I would 
say that it would be very difficult for him to understand what . . . he would 
be signing.” Id. 
                                              
4  The State’s question was as follows: “Based upon your psychiatry 
degree, based upon your daily interaction with David O. Jones, do you have 
an opinion whether or not he could read this document and comprehend it?” 
R539. Tower’s degree was in psychology, not psychiatry. R532. And though 
the question asked David to use his psychology training, it does not change 
the fact that his testimony was based on his personal observations, not his 
psychology training, and that reasonable counsel could conclude that any lay 
person who had interacted with David could have provided the same 
testimony.  
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 This is lay opinion testimony. An average bystander, with no scientific, 
technical, or other specialized training, could opine that a 90-year-old man, 
with progressive dementia—who cannot answer questions beyond “how are 
you,” who cannot take care of his day-to-day needs, or make decisions on his 
own—would have difficulty understanding a complex financial document. 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶¶11, 34. At a minimum, Tower’s testimony is not 
so clearly expert testimony that all competent defense attorneys would have 
recognized it as such.  
b. Mack’s testimony. 
 Mack’s testimony is similar. Mack visited David roughly ten months 
after he signed the Loan Document. In this visit, David couldn’t remember 
his age, birthday, how to call 911, what military branch he served in, where 
he banked, or his siblings’ names. R669. When Mack asked David for Jones’s 
phone number, he went to the counter, picked up a fingernail kit, and gave it 
to Mack. R669. 
 Based on these observations, Mack opined that: (1) David had 
“significant memory impairment,” (2) ten months earlier David did not have 
capacity to sign the Loan Document, and (3) four months later David did not 
have capacity to sign the Financial Control Documents. R668, 678–79, 682–83, 
SE17–19. 
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 An average bystander, with no scientific, technical, or other specialized 
training, could opine that a 90-year-old man, with progressive dementia—
who does not remember his age, how to call 911, or his siblings’ names, and 
brings a fingernail kit when asked for a phone number—has memory 
impairment and is incapable of understanding complex financial 
documents.5 At a minimum, Mack’s testimony is not so clearly expert that all 
competent defense attorneys would have recognized it as such.  
2. Reasonable counsel could conclude that an objection 
would have been futile.  
 Tower had a bachelor’s degree in psychology, a master’s in counseling 
and psychology, and almost twenty years’ experience in working with 
elderly persons. R532–33. So reasonable counsel could conclude that an 
                                              
5  Jones argues that Mack’s testimony about David’s capacity to sign 
the Loan and Financial Control Documents could not qualify as lay testimony 
because it was not “rationally based on [Mack’s] perception.” Aplt.Brf.17–18. 
That is, because Mack did not see Jones at or near the time that he signed the 
documents she could not testify to his mental state on those occasions 
without offering expert testimony. Id. Jones may have a point on the Loan 
Document, which was signed 10 months before Mack first met David. But 
there was already plenty of evidence, including Jones’s admission, that David 
lacked capacity to sign that document. 
He has no such point on the Financial Control Documents. True, Mack 
saw David four months before he signed the Financial Control Documents. 
Yet, at that point, it was already clear that David lacked capacity to sign. As 
David was suffering from progressive dementia, his mental capacity would 
have only been worse—not better—four months down the line. 
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objection would have been futile (as Tower was qualified); or worse, it may 
have resulted in the prosecution chronicling Tower’s experience in front of 
the jury, which would have increased the persuasiveness of his testimony. 
 The same is true of Mack. Mack had a bachelor’s degree in gerontology 
and master’s in social work. R666. She had worked for Adult Protective 
Services for seven years where she had conducted nearly a thousand 
evaluations of cognitively-impaired adults and was trained to do cognitive 
testing and capacity assessments. R666–67, 687. Again, reasonable counsel 
could conclude that an objection would have been futile (as Mack was 
qualified); or worse, it may have resulted in the prosecution chronicling 
Mack’s experience in front of the jury, which would have increased the 
persuasiveness of her testimony.6  
                                              
6  Jones suggests that his counsel may have been deficient for not 
investigating Mack’s qualifications. Aplt.Brf.18–19 (stating counsel “was not 
in a position to weigh the relative risks of objecting against the need to object 
without at least investigating whether [Mack] was qualified . . . .”). But there 
is no record evidence that counsel had not investigated Mack’s qualifications. 
Indeed, the record shows the opposite. Jones’s counsel knew that Mack did 
not have degrees in psychology or psychiatry, knew that she did not do a 
cognitive test on David, and was prepared to highlight issues with her 
testimony such as the timing of when she visited David. R86–88.  
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3. Jones has not proved that all competent counsel would 
have tried to exclude the testimony on lack-of-notice 
grounds. 
 Even if counsel could have shown that Tower’s and Mack’s testimony 
was expert testimony, the trial court could have excluded it for lack of notice 
only if it found that the State deliberately withheld notice in “bad faith.” Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4). Jones has not alleged, let alone proven, that that was 
so.  
 On the record, then, counsel could have at most secured a continuance 
on lack-of-notice grounds; but again, only if he could show that Tower’s and 
Mack’s testimony was expert testimony. Id. But Jones has not shown that all 
competent counsel would have asked for a continuance or even concluded 
that one was desirable. Counsel knew Mack and Tower would testify, knew 
their qualifications, had prepared for both, and countered their testimony on 
cross-examination and with other witnesses. Not only that, but Jones offers 
nothing to suggest that there was a reasonable probability that a continuance 
would have changed the outcome of his trial.    
4. There is no prejudice because the “expert” testimonies 
were merely cumulative of David’s poor mental capacity. 
 Jones says that Tower’s and Mack’s “expert” opinions were prejudicial 
because they bolstered the prosecution’s case that David lacked capacity. 
Aplt.Brf.20–21. But showing that evidence may have bolstered a fact does not 
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answer Strickland’s prejudice inquiry: whether there is a reasonable 
probability that without Tower’s and Mack’s opinions the result of would 
have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see State 
v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ¶44, 248 P.3d 984 (noting that even if testimony 
results in improper bolstering there is no reversal “unless it was prejudicial”). 
Here, given the overwhelming evidence of David’s incapacity, there is no 
such probability. 
 First, Jones admitted his father lacked capacity to sign the Loan and 
Financial Control Documents. According to Jones, his father started showing 
signs of dementia in 2010. R808. Three years later, but before Jones got David 
to sign either document, Jones admitted that his father was “incompetent”; 
and lacked capacity to sign things like a lease or a personal guarantee. R835–
36, 838, 840, SE23. When he checked his father into Highland Cove, Jones 
again repeated that his father was “arguabl[y] . . . incompetent” at that time. 
R808. These admissions are enough to dispel any notions of prejudice. But 
there is more. 
 Multiple lay witnesses described David’s incapacity long before he 
signed the Loan Document. 
▪ Eight years before signing the Loan Document, David could not 
recognize his brother, was noticeably disoriented, and “wasn’t entirely 
with it.” R600. 
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▪ A couple of months before signing the Loan Document, David became 
disoriented and could no longer live on his own. R695, 812.  
 
▪ Three weeks before signing the Loan Document, Jones admitted his 
father to Highland Cove, stating his father suffered from “progressive 
dementia.” R516, 536, SE1.  
 
▪ When the Loan Document was signed, David could not express 
himself in words, answer basic questions, or engage in meaningful 
conversations; he could not make his own food, bathe himself, or dress 
himself. R536–38, 557. 
 
Over a year later, when David signed the Financial Control Document, his 
condition was worse:  
▪ David could not remember the date or year. R696. 
 
▪ When asked, “How are you today?” R697. David laughed and said, “I 
don’t remember.” Id. When asked, “What are you going to do for fun 
today?”; he couldn’t answer. Id.  
 
▪ David could give only two- to four-word answers to questions. R699. 
 
▪ David couldn’t remember his age, birthday, where he had worked or 
banked, his income, his siblings’ names, or how to call 911. R669. 
 
▪ Immediately after talking on the phone, David could not remember 
who he had talked to or what he talked about. R669, 675–77. 
 
▪ He would hold the phone, listen to the dial tone, and appear confused. 
R698–99.  
 
▪ When asked for a phone number, David brought a fingernail kit. R669. 
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▪ David couldn’t draw a clock, tell time, identify a lion or a rhinoceros, 
repeat sentences or even simple one- or two-syllable words like “face” 
or “church,” answer basic math questions, or recognize letters from the 
alphabet. R703–05. 
 
 The prosecution’s actual expert, Perrine Anderson (David’s geriatric 
nurse practitioner), started visiting David about four months after he signed 
the Loan Document and had visited him at least 25 times since. R697. During 
a visit that was one month before David signed the Financial Control 
Documents, Anderson gave David a MoCA test, which is the preferred 
screening tool for dementia. R702. David received the lowest possible score 
on the test, 0 out of 30 points. R707. On his best day, during all 25 visits, 
Anderson opined that David may have scored 2 or 3 points. R722. Anderson 
further opined that David would not have been able to read, much less 
understand, the Financial Control Documents and if you had come back into 
the room ten minutes after he had signed them, he would not remember it. 
R697–99, 701, 721–22.  
* * * * 
 In sum, Jones may be right: Tower’s and Mack’s testimonies may have 
bolstered the prosecution’s case to a small degree. That is, they may have 
added a piece to the already overwhelming evidence of David’s incapacity. 
But that doesn’t prove prejudice. It’s not enough for Jones to say that their 
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testimonies added something to the evidence. Rather, Jones must show that 
subtracting their testimonies, there is a reasonable probability that the jury 
would have doubted David’s incapacity. Jones doesn’t—and can’t—do that 
here.   
B. Counsel was not ineffective for not objecting alleged 404(b) 
evidence. 
 Jones complains that his counsel should have objected to: (1) a one-
page, handwritten document showing loans made to Jones from 1998–2000—
more than ten years before David’s dementia set in, and (2) the Brewhaha 
lease agreement, signed by Jones and David. Aplt.Brf.22–23. According to 
him, these were 404(b) evidence. Id. And because trial counsel did not receive 
notice of them as was requested and required for actual 404(b) evidence, his 
counsel should have objected. Id. 
 Jones has not proved that all competent counsel would have thought 
that this was 404(b) evidence, or would have objected either way. And he has 
not proved a reasonable probability that excluding the evidence would have 
made a more favorable result reasonably likely.  
1. The loan evidence did not prejudice Jones and reasonable 
counsel could chose not to object.  
 The prosecution introduced a one-page, handwritten document 
showing that someone had loaned Jones $64,300 from 1998 to 2000. SE20. The 
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prosecution asked an investigator just two questions about this document 
(confirming that the document showed loans to Jones and that there was no 
indication that interest had been paid) during the two-day, thirteen-witness 
trial. R685. There was no discussion of who made the loans, what they were 
for, or whether they were paid. It was not discussed again in closing or 
elsewhere.  
 Where “it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground 
of lack of sufficient prejudice,” as it is here, the Court should do so without 
reaching the deficient performance question. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
 Jones makes no effort to show how this loan evidence prejudiced him. 
Instead, his prejudice argument focuses on the Brewhaha lease. Aplt.Brf.26–
28. Nowhere does he prove what Strickland prejudice requires: a reasonable 
probability that without the loan evidence the outcome of his trial would 
have been different. 466 U.S. at 694.  
 And Jones couldn’t prove prejudice even if he had tried. Yes, if we 
assume that the loans were never repaid—because it is unclear if they were—
then the document could show that Jones had a habit of not paying his loans. 
But this case is not about unpaid loans. It is about Jones’s abuse of his 
fiduciary power and his exploitation of father. And the evidence on these 
points was overwhelming. See subsection I.A.4, supra and section III, infra.  
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 Moreover, the loan evidence may have helped Jones. If these were 
loans from his father, as Jones says (Aplt.Brf.24 n.10), then it was at least some 
circumstantial evidence supporting his story that his father wanted to invest 
in Brewhaha, which was Jones’s defense. R509, 886–87, 889. It showed that 
almost ten years before any dementia or mental illness clouded his judgment, 
David loaned him nearly $65,000, which could have been seen as some 
support for his claim that David wanted to loan him the nearly $80,000 that 
he took for his restaurants.  
 Jones has not proved how, in light of all the overwhelming evidence, 
this record of unpaid loans from ten years earlier was enough to tip the scales 
against him. 
 Jones also cannot show deficient performance. He says that there was 
no “sound trial strategy” for not objecting. Aplt.Brf.25. But “sound trial 
strategy” is not the standard for deficient performance. See Knowles v. 
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121 (2009); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 
481 (2000). The question for deficient performance “is not whether counsel’s 
choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.” Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. at 481. Jones must show that all competent counsel would have objected 
to the loan evidence. But as shown, the loan evidence could reasonably be 
considered supportive of the defense. A competent attorney may choose not 
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to object to evidence that could be seen as helpful. In any event, Jones has not 
shown that it was so clearly damaging to the defense that no competent 
counsel would have let it be admitted unchallenged.   
2. Reasonable counsel could conclude that rule 404(b) did not 
apply to the Brewhaha lease. In any event, the Brewhaha 
lease did not prejudice Jones.  
 Jones says that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
Brewhaha lease that he and David signed. Aplt.Brf.25–26. According to him, 
the lease was 404(b) evidence. Id. And because he never received notice of it 
as he had requested, he says that his counsel should have objected on lack-
of-notice grounds and there was no “reasonable trial strategy” for not doing 
so. Id. 
 Again, the question for deficient performance “is not whether counsel’s 
choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.” Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. at 481.  
 Here, reasonable counsel could conclude that the lease agreement was 
not 404(b) evidence. The Brewhaha lease, by itself, was not evidence of a 
“crime, wrong, or other act” that was used “to prove [Jones’s] character,” or 
anyone’s character. Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1). It’s only Jones’s later, in-court 
representation that he knew his father was “not competent” at the time he 
signed the Brewhaha lease that makes having his father sign the lease a bad 
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act. SE23. But Jones’s in-court representation of his father’s incompetency was 
admissible irrespective of whether the lease’s admissibility. And as such, the 
lease, as the physical document that his father signed was going to be 
admissible too. 
 Further, because getting his father to sign the Brewhaha lease when his 
father was incompetent to do so is integral, that is “intrinsic,” to Jones’s 
crimes, it is not evidence of another crime used to prove his general criminal 
character. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶14 n.7 (cleaned up) (noting that if 
challenged evidence is “inextricably intertwined with the crime that is 
charged,” or “if both the crime charged and the prior act are considered part 
of a single criminal episode,” then rule 404(b) and its notice provisions do not 
apply); see United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1007 (10th Cir. 1993); State 
v. Burke, 2011 UT App 186, ¶¶65–66, 256 P.3d 1102. It’s evidence of this crime. 
At least counsel could reasonably so conclude.    
 Reasonable counsel could also choose not to object because, like the 
loan evidence, the Brewhaha lease could be considered supportive of the 
defense theory. It showed that his father, before admission to Highland Cove, 
signed the lease both as a tenant and as personal guarantor. This offered some 
support for Jones’s narrative that his father was his partner, wanted 
Brewhaha to succeed, and wanted to invest his money in it.  
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 For this reason, and others, there was no prejudice. The lease, by itself, 
did nothing to help the prosecution. What helped the prosecution was Jones’s 
admission in a later court filing that he knew his father was “not competent” 
when he signed the lease. SE23.7 But even if the lease had never been 
introduced, Jones’s admission would have been. It was his non-hearsay 
statement admitting that his father was “not competent” when he signed the 
lease that proved a central issue: David’s vulnerability and his incompetency 
to give his son money. The lease itself was not damning.   
C. Reasonable counsel could conclude that the substantial-risk-
of-loss element required only a reckless mental state.   
 The trial court, consistent with the statute, instructed the jury that to 
convict Jones of unlawful dealing, it had to find: 
1.  That [Jones]; 
 
2.  Acting intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect to each 
and every one of the following elements; 
 
3.  Dealt with property that had been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, 
in a manner in which the [Jones] knew (beyond just recklessness) was 
a violation of the [Jones]’s duty; 
 
                                              
7  Most of Jones’s prejudice argument focuses on his admission that he 
knew his father was incompetent. Again, that’s separate from the lease, is not 
404(b) evidence, and was always going to be admitted. So Jones cannot use it 
to argue prejudice.  
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4.  Which involved a substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner 
or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted; and  
 
5.  The total value of the property is equal to or exceeds $5,000.  
On the unlawful dealing charge, the jury was instructed as follows: 
 
R238. Jones says his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to this instruction 
because the unlawful dealing statute (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (West 2018)) 
requires at least a knowing mental state for the substantial-risk-of-loss 
element (the fourth element). Aplt.Brf.29–30. 
 Because this is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the question 
is not whether the unlawful dealing statute could be interpreted to require a 
knowing mental state for the substantial risk-of-loss element. That is a 
statutory argument that Jones did not make below and is thus unpreserved. 
Instead, the question for ineffective assistance of counsel is this: Did the 
unlawful dealing statute so clearly require a knowing mental state for the 
substantial-risk-of-loss element that all competent defense attorneys would 
have requested it? The answer is no.  
 Reasonable counsel could conclude that the knowing mental state did 
not apply to the substantial-risk-of-loss element. The unlawful dealing statute 
reads: 
A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with the property by a 
fiduciary if the person deals with property that has been entrusted to 
him as a fiduciary . . . in a manner in which the person knows is a 
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violation of the person’s duty and which involves substantial risk of 
loss or detriment to the owner . . . . 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513. The knowing mental state clearly applies to the 
violation-of-duty element, and the jury was so instructed. R238. But the 
statutory language does not clearly extend the knowing mental state to the 
substantial-risk-of-loss element. With no guidance from any appellate court 
or the legislature, reasonable counsel could conclude that the default 
intentional, knowing, or reckless mental state applied to the substantial-risk-
of-loss element. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (West 2018). And because that 
conclusion would be a reasonable one, counsel reasonably agreed to the jury 
being instructed in that language.  
 Jones has not demonstrated otherwise. He relies on extra-jurisdictional 
statutes and cases to support his argument that the substantial-risk-of-loss 
element also requires a “knowing” mental state. But counsel is not charged 
with knowing and arguing extra-jurisdictional authority. Instead, Jones must 
“demonstrate that [Utah] law at the time of his trial entitled him” to an 
instruction that the substantial-risk-of-loss element required a knowing 
mental state and that all reasonable counsel would have requested such an 
instruction.” State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). He fails to do so.  
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 In any event, Jones cannot prove prejudice. The evidence that he knew 
his actions involved of a substantial risk of loss or detriment to his father was 
overwhelming. See subsection III.B. infra.   
 And the jury found that Jones acted knowingly. In its special verdict 
form the jury found that Jones acted intentionally or knowingly with respect 
to all the elements of the exploitation of a vulnerable adult charge. R237, 253. 
So it necessarily found that Jones knowingly used at least $5,000 of his father’s 
resources for Jones’s own profit. And if Jones knowingly used his father’s 
resources for his own profit, he knew that his actions involved a substantial 
risk of loss. So there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have 
found that Jones’s actions were merely reckless as opposed to knowing.  
D. Jones’s convictions are not lesser-included offenses. 
 Jones’s argument that his counsel should have moved to merge his two 
convictions rests on his assumption that the unlawful dealing count is  
necessarily included in the exploitation count (or vice versa).8 It’s not.   
 Utah’s merger statute (Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2018)) 
“contains two merger tests.” State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, ¶22, n.6, 420 P.3d 
                                              
8  Jones never spells out which count he believes is the lesser and which 
is the greater. However, as detailed below, neither is a lesser-included of the 
other.  
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1064. The same criminal act test found in subsection (1) and the lesser-
included offense test found in subsection (3). Id.  
 Jones “makes no argument and provides no reasoned analysis 
concerning the applicability of subsection (1).” State v. Corona, 2018 UT App 
154, ¶45, --- P.3d ---. He “does not address the question of whether his 
[unlawful dealing and exploitation counts] constitute a single offense, but 
instead only ‘compares the statutory elements of each offense’ and attempts 
to determine whether a greater-lesser relationship exists.” Id.; see Aplt.Brf.48–
53. “Accordingly, under subsection (1), [Jones] has failed to demonstrate that 
his claim is meritorious and has therefore failed to show that his counsel was 
ineffective” for not moving to merge the two counts based on the same 
criminal act test. Id.9  
 So the only question Jones presents is whether his counsel was 
ineffective for not moving to merge one of his two crimes into the other as a 
lesser-included offense.  
                                              
9  Jones cites subsection (1)’s same criminal act language. Aplt.Brf.48. 
But then lays out the test for lesser-included offenses and analyzes his claim 
thereunder. Id. at 49.  
Even if he had made the same criminal act argument, his claim would 
fail. His two convictions required separate acts. For unlawful dealing, he had 
to be his father’s fiduciary. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513; R238. For exploitation 
of a vulnerable adult, he had to take advantage of his father’s vulnerable 
condition. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111; R237. Those acts are not the same.  
-44- 
 An offense is an included offense, and merges with the greater, when 
“[i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish commission of the offense charged.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(3)(a) (emphasis added). “To be necessarily included in the greater 
offense, the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the 
greater without first having committed the lesser.” Schmuck v. United States, 
489 U.S. 705, 719 (1989) (cleaned up); see State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, 
¶10, 71 P.3d 624. Thus, if “the lesser offense requires an element not required 
for the greater offense,” it is not a lesser included offense. Schmuck, 489 U.S. 
at 716; see Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ¶10.  
 The question of whether a lesser-greater relationship exists “turns on 
the statutorily defined elements of the two crimes.” Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 
¶16 overruled in part by State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, ¶33, --- P.3d ---. While 
courts may look “to the facts to determine what crime, or variation of the 
crime, was proved . . . once this determination is made, the court looks [only] 
to [its] statutory elements.” Id. In other words, “the focus” of any lesser-
included-offense analysis “is on the [crime’s] statutory elements” not the facts 
used to prove those elements. State v. Meacham, 2000 UT App 247, ¶29, 9 P.3d 
777. 
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 Here, unlawful dealing requires that Jones be a fiduciary; there is no 
such requirement for exploitation of a vulnerable adult. Compare Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-513 (West 2018) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111 (West 2018); see 
also R237–38 (providing the jury instructions in this case).10 Similarly, 
exploitation of a vulnerable adult requires a vulnerable adult; there is no such 
requirement for unlawful dealing. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111 with 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513; see also R237–38. Because Jones could commit 
each crime without necessarily committing the other, they are not lesser-
included offenses. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716; Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ¶10. 
And as such, any merger motion would have been futile; Jones’s counsel 
cannot be ineffective for not making a futile motion. State v. Heywood, 2015 
UT App 191, ¶48, 357 P.3d 565 (citing State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶26, 1 P.3d 
546). 
E. Jones has shown no error, let alone cumulative error 
 Jones finally asks this Court to reverse based on cumulative error, if 
nothing else. But because he has not shown any error, he necessarily cannot 
                                              
10  True, some variations of exploitation of a vulnerable adult may 
include a fiduciary element. For example, one variation requires that the 
defendant be in a “position of trust,” which includes a fiduciary. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(i). Another variation requires that the defendant “use[] 
a vulnerable adult’s power of attorney or guardianship” for the profit of 
someone other than a vulnerable adult. Id. § 76-5-11(4)(a)(iv). But neither of 
those variations were charged here, nor was the jury instructed on them.  
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show cumulative error. See State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶¶39–40, 
872 Utah Adv. Rep. 51. 
II. 
Jones lacks standing to challenge the exploitation of a 
vulnerable adult statute because it is not vague as 
applied to his conduct. 
 A person is guilty of second-degree exploitation of a vulnerable adult 
if, acting with intent or knowledge, he or she “unjustly or improperly uses or 
manages the resources of a vulnerable adult for the profit or advantage of 
someone other than the vulnerable adult.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111
(4)(a)(iii) (West 2018). According to Jones, the terms “unjust” and “improper” 
are unconstitutionally vague because they are subjective and “could lead to 
charges against virtually anyone who uses a vulnerable adult’s resources for 
the use of anyone other than the vulnerable adult.” Aplt.Brf.38–45. 
 The vagueness doctrine “is an outgrowth . . . of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). 
Some vagueness is inherent in language—“[c]ondemned to the use of words, 
we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” Grayned v. 
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). So the Constitution “does not require 
impossible standards” and the elimination of any possible vagueness. United 
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). A statute is only unconstitutionally vague 
because it either “fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
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opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits,” or “it authorizes or 
even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 
530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999) 
State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶43, 99 P.3d 820. 
 It is well-established that a defendant “who engages in some conduct 
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as 
applied to the conduct of others.” Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495. 
So a court should “examine the [defendant’s] conduct before analyzing other 
hypothetical applications of the law.” Id. If the defendant’s conduct is clearly 
prohibited, then he lacks standing to challenge the statute based on another’s 
hypothetical conduct. State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶44, 100 P.3d 231; 
State v. Jones, 2018 UT App 110, ¶16, 427 P.3d 538. 
 Here, Jones lacks standing because his conduct is clearly prohibited. 
Jones, acting intentionally or knowingly (R237, 253), took his 90-year-old, 
demented father’s retirement income (whom Jones admitted was 
“incompetent” at this point) —including $900/month from his father’s long-
term care policy—to pay for Jones’s living expenses and his two failed 
restaurants, while refusing to pay for his father’s rent, care, prescriptions, or 
personal needs such as a haircut or bed pads. Any person of ordinary 
intelligence, “would have had to have known that wherever the precise 
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boundary between [just] and [unjust use of his father’s resources] might lie,” 
his conduct clearly fell on the side of unjust and improper. State v. Tulley, 2018 
UT 35, ¶69, 428 P.3d 1005.11 
  Jones ignores his conduct. He uses nearly all his vagueness argument 
(10 of 11 paragraphs) to explore the hypothetical conduct of others or 
decisions from other jurisdictions. Aplt.Brf.38–45. In his final, two-sentence 
paragraph, he concludes—with no analysis—that the exploitation statute is 
vague as applied to him because “he was not put on notice as to any lay 
activity what [sic] conduct constituted improper or unjust management of 
[his father’s] resources.” Aplt.Brf.44–45. But an as-applied challenge is not 
concerned with what general conduct is unjust or improper, it is about 
whether Jones’s specific conduct was. Here, by any definition, Jones’s conduct 
                                              
11 Not only that, but Jones’s conduct clearly violated other more specific 
provisions of the exploitation statute that Jones does not assail as vague 
(although he was not charged under these variations). For example, under 
subsection 4(a)(ii) Jones was guilty of second-degree felony exploitation if, 
acting intentionally or knowingly, he “[knew] or should know[n] that the 
vulnerable adult lack[ed] capacity to consent, and obtain[ed] or use[d] . . . the 
vulnerable adult’s funds, assets, or property with intent to temporarily or 
permanently deprive the vulnerable adult of the use, benefit, or possession of 
his property, for the benefit of someone other than the vulnerable adult.” 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(ii). Jones said his father was incompetent well 
before he started taking his  money—so Jones knew or should have known 
his father lacked capacity to consent to his use of all his father’s resources for 
Jones’s own personal gain.   
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was unjust and improper. Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶69. And because it is, Jones 
has no standing to mount a facial challenge to the exploitation statute. Ansari, 
2004 UT App 326, ¶44; see Jones, 2018 UT App 110, ¶17. 
 In any event, persons of ordinary intelligence are on notice of what is 
“unjust” or “improper” when they read the exploitation statute as a whole.  
When interpreting a statute, this Court’s objective is “to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the act was meant to achieve.” 
Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah 1998). In discerning that intent, 
the Court looks first to the statute’s plain language—with a presumption that 
“the legislature chose its words carefully, using each term advisedly” and 
“according to its ordinary meaning.” State v. LeBeau, 2014 UT 39, ¶26, 337 P.3d 
254. “The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its 
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute 
or with other statutes under the same or related chapters.” State v. MacGuire, 
2004 UT 4, ¶15, 84 P.3d 1171, 1175 (Utah 2004) (cleaned up). 
 Here, the terms “unjust” and “improper” do not appear in isolation. 
The exploitation statute lists five variations of the crime. The first prohibits 
employing deception or intimidation to obtain or use a vulnerable adult’s 
resources for someone other than the vulnerable adult. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-111(4)(i). The second makes it a crime to use a vulnerable adult’s resources 
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for someone other than the vulnerable adult when the vulnerable adult lacks 
the capacity to consent. Id. § 76-5-111(4)(ii). The third—the subsection under 
which Jones was charged—makes it a crime to “unjustly” or “improperly” 
use a vulnerable adult’s resources for the profit of someone other than the 
vulnerable adult. Id. § 76-5-111(4)(iii). The fourth makes it a crime for a power 
of attorney or guardian to “unjustly” or “improperly” use the vulnerable 
adult’s resources for the profit of someone other than the vulnerable adult. 
Id. § 76-5-111(4)(iv). And the fifth makes it a crime to “involve a vulnerable 
adult who lacks the capacity to consent in the facilitation” of a crime. Id. § 76-
5-111(4)(v).  
 Read as a whole, the legislature clearly sought to prohibit a particular 
type of conduct: use of a vulnerable adult’s resources, without proper consent 
or authorization, for the profit of someone other than the vulnerable adult. Id. 
§ 76-5-111(4). So the terms “unjust” and “improper,” in context, relate to 
whether the vulnerable adult consented or authorized the use of his resources 
or if the defendant used deceit, intimidation, undue influence, persuasion, or 
other means to obtain it.  
 Jones clearly understood this. His argument below was that his actions 
were not unjust or improper because his father consented to them and did so 
when he was still capable of consent. That is, he knew that if his father did 
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not consent, or lacked capacity to do so, his actions were unjust or improper. 
And his consent defense shows that he clearly knew what he needed to 
address to avoid a conviction. 
 The plain meaning of the terms “unjust” and “improper” are also not 
difficult for ordinary people to understand or apply. “Unjust” simply means, 
“Contrary to justice, not fair or reasonable.”  Unjust, Black’s Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014). Exploitation itself is defined is defined in reference to “unjust” 
actions. Exploitation, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“exploitation” as “taking unjust advantage of another for one’s own benefit 
or selfish ends” (emphasis added)). And “Improper” means, “Incorrect, 
unsuitable or irregular; Fraudulent or otherwise wrongful.” Improper, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
 No ordinary person would think it unjust or improper (that is, unfair, 
unreasonable, fraudulent, or wrongful) for a child to ask a vulnerable parent 
for help paying college tuition or buying a home. Aplt.Brf.41. But an ordinary 
person would find it unjust or improper, (that is, unfair, unreasonable, 
fraudulent, or wrongful) for a child to ask, knowing the vulnerable parent 
lacked capacity to consent, or using intimidation or deceit to obtain their 
consent, or persuading, pushing, manipulating, or using other means to take 
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the money or obtain the “consent.” This is not nearly as complicated as Jones 
tries to make it.  
 Moreover, the statute is not one of strict liability, as Jones suggests. 
Aplt.Brf.40 (arguing that the statute “could lead to charges against virtually 
anyone who uses a vulnerable adult’s resources for the use of anyone other 
than the vulnerable adult.”). It requires Jones, or any other defendant, to act 
intentionally or knowingly for felony exploitation. That is, Jones had to at 
least know that his father was a vulnerable adult. He had to at least know 
that his actions were unjust or improper. And he had to know that he was 
using his father’s resources for his own profit. It wasn’t enough that he acted 
negligently or recklessly.12 As the United States’ Supreme Court, and Utah’s 
supreme court, note, “scienter requirements” like the ones here, “alleviate 
vagueness concerns.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007); see Due 
South, Inc. v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 2008 UT 71, ¶46, 197 P.3d 82; State 
v. Sailer, 684 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1995). 
 None of Jones’s out-of-state cases are persuasive or even helpful. While 
they use similar words (e.g., “illegal,” “improper,” and “unjust”) each is part 
                                              
12  If he had acted with criminal negligence or recklessness, he would 
have been guilty of a class B or A (respectively) misdemeanor. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(b)(iii)–(iv).  
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of a larger statute with significant differences. Aplt.Brf.41–43. As an example, 
the Mississippi statute Jones references made “the illegal or improper use of 
a vulnerable person or his resources for  another’s profit or advantage, with 
or without the consent of the vulnerable adult” a crime. Decker v. State, 66 
So.2d 654, 658 (Miss. 2011) (emphasis in original). So any use, even with 
consent, could be improper. Id. It was the “with or without the consent” 
language as much as the “improper use” that troubled the Mississippi 
supreme court. Id. Utah does not contain the “with or without consent 
language” or anything like it. Not only that, but Utah’s statute contains 
multiple variations of the crime and is part of a much broader exploitation 
statute.  
 The same problems exist with Jones’s Florida case, Cuda v. State. There, 
the statute made it a crime to “improper[ly] or illegal[ly] use or manage[] the 
funds, assets, property, power of attorney, or guardianship of [an] aged 
person or disabled adult for profit.” 639 So.2d 22, 23 n.1. Again, unlike Utah’s, 
there were no variations or descriptions of the type of prohibited acts. Id. And 
the court also failed to review Cuda’s actions and whether the statute, as 
applied to Cuda, was vague. Something this Court has made clear must occur 
first. See supra. 
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 And Jones’s out-of-court cases are not unanimous. State v. Sailer, for 
example, found a statute similar to Utah’s was not unconstitutionally vague. 
684 A.2d 1247 (Del. 1994). There, the statute defined exploitation as the 
“illegal or improper use or abuse of an infirm person, his resources or his 
rights, by another person, whether for profit or other advantage.” Id. at 1249 
n.1. Delaware held that this statute was not vague because, like Utah’s, the 
legislature’s intent, the language of the statute, the mental-state requirement, 
and the plain meaning of the terms “illegal” and “improper” “adequately 
notified” defendants of what actions were unlawful. Id.   
* * * * 
 In sum, Jones lacks standing to raise a vagueness claim. But the statute 
is not vague because it clearly prohibits Jones from taking all his 90-year-old, 
demented, incompetent father’s retirement income (roughly $6,500 a month, 
including $900/month from his father’s long-term care insurance policy)to 
pay for Jones’s personal living expenses and his two failed restaurants, while 
refusing to pay for his father’s rent, care, prescriptions, or basic personal 
needs.  
III. 
There is sufficient evidence of Jones’s intent. 
 Jones says that the trial court erred when it denied his directed verdict 
motion. Aplt.Brf.45–47. According to him, there was insufficient evidence 
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that he knew he had “violated his fiduciary duty and that the breach involved 
a substantial risk of loss,” as required by his unlawful dealing conviction. Id. 
at 46. And, he says, there was insufficient evidence that he “unjustly or 
improperly used or managed” his father’s resources to his own advantage, as 
required by his exploitation conviction. Id.  
 This claim fails for a few reasons. First, it is unpreserved, and Jones 
fails to adequately argue that a preservation exception applies. So this Court 
should decline to review it. Second, even if preserved, there is more than 
enough evidence to support both convictions. 
A. This issue is unpreserved. 
 An issue is preserved if it is “presented to the trial court in such a way 
that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” 438 Main St. v. 
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶51, 99 P.3d 801 (cleaned up). This requires the 
issue to be both timely and specifically raised, with supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority. Id.; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 12(a) (“A motion shall 
state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and 
the relief sought.”). 
 That didn’t happen here. Jones claims that his generic directed verdict 
motion preserved the issue. Aplt.Brf.3 (citing R753). At the close of the State’s 
case, counsel asked for a “directed verdict for insufficiency of the evidence.” 
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R753. When asked if he “want[ed] to make an argument,” counsel declined, 
and the court summarily denied the motion. Id. That was all.  
 “[A] generic motion for a directed verdict,” like Jones’s, can preserve a 
specific ground for appeal only when “‘the specific ground for an objection 
is clear from its context.’” State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ¶22, 354 P.3d 791 
(quoting State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶26, 345 P.3d 1168); see State v. Doyle, 
2018 UT App 239, --- P.3d ---. For example, in Gonzalez, it was clear that 
Gonzalez’s generic directed verdict motion was based on the State’s alleged 
failure to disprove self defense because that was Gonzalez’s “sole defense” to 
the murder charge. 2015 UT 10, ¶26. And in Doyle it was clear that Doyle’s 
directed verdict motion that the state had the burden to prove self defense 
and that it had to “present more than it had” was enough to preserve an 
argument that the self-defense evidence was inconclusive and speculative. 
2018 UT App 239, ¶16. 
 Unlike Gonzalez or Doyle, there is no one clear ground for Jones’s 
motion. Jones had two, separate charges: exploitation of a vulnerable adult 
and unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary.13 Both have several elements 
                                              
13  Gonzalez had two charges too, murder and obstruction of justice. 
2015 UT 10, ¶26. But  Gonzalez’s “obstruction-of-justice charge turned on his 
challenge to the murder charge.” Id. So, unlike here, the obstruction charge 
depended on the murder charge. Id.  
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that Jones disputed. For example, on his exploitation charge, Jones disputed 
that he acted with intent and that he unjustly or improperly used his father’s 
resources. On his unlawful-dealing charge, he disputed that he knowingly 
violated a duty to his father and that his actions involved a substantial risk of 
loss to his father. His perfunctory motion failed to identify which of these 
elements he alleges the State did not prove and fails to provide any 
supportive reasoning or authority. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶16, 164 P.3d 
397; State v. Bosquez, 2012 UT App 89, ¶7, 275 P.3d 1032.14  
 The purpose of the preservation requirement is to put the “trial judge 
on notice of the asserted error and allow[ ] for [timely] correction.” 438 Main 
Street, 2004 UT 72, ¶51. Jones’s motion did not call the judge’s attention to the 
problem he raises here: a lack of evidence of intent. So the trial court never 
had a chance to address this issue. This Court should not address it either.  
 Jones says, in a footnote, that this Court may nevertheless review this 
claim for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt.Brf.46 n.18. But 
                                              
14  And the seriousness of his exploitation charge varies based on his 
mental state. If it was done intentionally or knowingly, it is a second-degree 
felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-110(4)(b) (West 2018). If done recklessly, it is a 
class A misdemeanor. Id. Jones advocated that an instruction on the lesser, 
class-A offense be given to the jury. Yet his directed verdict motion fails to 
state whether he believes the State failed to prove an intentional or knowing 
mental state, a reckless mental state, or any mental state.   
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while an unpreserved claim can be reviewed for plain error or ineffective 
assistance, it is not enough to merely utter those words in a footnote without 
providing any analysis or application of these doctrines to his specific facts. 
See State v. Padilla, 2018 UT App 108, ¶19, --- P.3d ---. 
B. Jones’s claim is meritless. 
 When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, this Court 
does not “sit as a second fact finder.” Salt Lake City v. Miles, 2014 UT 47, ¶10, 
342 P.3d 212. Instead, its review “is limited to insuring that there is sufficient 
competent evidence regarding each element of the charge to enable a jury to 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime.” 
Id. In doing so, this Court must view the “evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn therefrom . . . in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict.” Id. In the end, so long as there is “some evidence” to support 
each element, this Court’s sufficiency inquiry ends. Id. 
 Jones says that there was insufficient evidence that he knew he had 
violated his fiduciary duty or that he knew was using his father’s retirement 
income unjustly or improperly. Aplt.Brf.46–47. He also claims that there was 
no evidence that his actions created a substantial risk of loss. Id.  
 But there is overwhelming evidence to support both, and far more than 
his stingy recitation (see Aplt.Brf.46–47). Consider the following: 
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▪ By his own admission, Jones knew his father was “not competent” no 
later than 2012. R808, 837–38, SE23. 
 
▪ A year later, Jones had his father sign a lease for Brewhaha that Jones 
knew contained provisions that were “harsh” and “incredibly unfair,” 
and even though the prior tenant warned Jones about the landlord. 
R807, 836–37, SE23. 
 
▪ Six months later, shortly after his father’s three-night hospital stay, 
twenty-day rehabilitation, and after he was checked in to Highland 
Cove for “progressive dementia,” Jones had his father sign the Loan 
Document, which allowed Jones to loan himself all his father’s 
retirement income. R516, 536, SE1, 16. 
 
▪ Over the next several months, Jones “loaned” himself all his father’s 
$6,500/month retirement income, including $900/month that was 
from a long-term care policy specifically created to pay for his father’s 
care, then used that money to pay for Brewhaha and Jones’s own 
personal living expenses because Jones was unemployed. R661, 820, 
824–25, 853. 
 
▪ When Brewhaha failed, and after a six-figure judgment, Jones chose to 
open another restaurant, again with his father’s retirement income, and 
again without paying for his father’s care. R807, 735, 820–25, SE23 
 
▪ Although he used his father’s retirement income for his restaurants, 
and claimed his father was his partner, his father was not listed as an 
owner on the business registration documents. R735. 
 
▪ In one year, Jones took more than $60,000 from his father’s retirement 
income. R742, 830–32. 
 
▪ In that same year, Jones made just four payments to Highland Cove 




▪ Jones failed to pay for his father’s personal expenses, such as a haircut 
a bed pad, or his medications. R523, 543, 573, SE3. 
 
▪ Highland Cove sent Jones monthly bills and statements requesting 
payment. R519, 556, SE3. 
 
▪ Highland Cove spoke with Jones several times each month about his 
need to make payments. R522, 541–42. 
 
▪ Highland Cove sent an eviction notice, but Jones still refused to make 
payments or remove his father from Highland Cove. R543–44, SE4. 
 
▪ Tower, Highland Cove’s manager, did not agree to let Jones miss or 
defer payments.15 
 
▪ When Jones learned that the Public Guardian was taking over his 
father’s income, and he would no longer have access to it, Jones 
continued to try to siphon his father’s resources by opening a new 
credit card in his father’s name and, in three weeks, transferring an 
almost $5,000 balance from an old card in his father’s name, ran up 
$14,000 in new charges, some for the restaurant and some for his own 
personal pleasure (like Snowbird or cable television), and then asked 
the Public Guardian to pay for these expenses. R663, 729–30, SE25–26 
 
                                              
15  Jones’s brief says that the evidence showed that “Tower did not 
recall the arrangement with [Jones] to defer payments.” Aplt.Brf.46. That is 
wrong. Especially where, as here, the evidence is to be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury’s verdict. When asked if he let Jones defer 
payments, Tower said bluntly, “No. That would not have been my standard 
procedure.” R548 (cleaned up). True, Tower did say it was possible that Jones 
asked for a deferment (Tower could not remember if he had) and that he did 
not recall the specifics of his conversations with Jones, but Tower reiterated 
that he “would not have agreed to postponement of months of nonpayment.” 
R552–53 (emphasis added).  
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▪ Jones drafted documents to try and retake control of his father’s income 
from the Public Guardian and had his father—who at this point could 
not identify a lion or rhinoceros or repeat one- or two-syllable words—
sign them. SE17–19. 
 
This evidence is overwhelming of Jones’s knowledge. When it is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as it must be, it is much more 
than “some evidence” of Jones knowledge and ends this Court’s sufficiency 
inquiry. Miles, 2014 UT 47, ¶10. 
 Jones also says that there was “no evidence that there was ever an 
actual substantial risk of loss” because his father was not evicted, and 
Highland Cove could not evict him. R47. Yet Jones ignores the more than 
$60,000 that he “loaned” himself from his father’s retirement income, the 
more than $19,000 in charges that rang up on his father’s credit card, and the 
fact that he then discharged any obligation he had to repay these amounts his 
personal bankruptcy.16 So not only was there a “risk of loss,” there was an 
actual loss. That’s why the trial court ordered Jones to pay $75,000 in complete 
restitution. Complete restitution is the amount “necessary to compensate a 
                                              
16  This is consistent with Jones’s unwillingness below to accept any 
responsibility for his actions. For sentencing, he said that he was “grateful 
that through all of this [his] father had suffered no harm and no loss.” R978, 
R1003, 1011. The court responded, “Your father suffered a loss in terms of the 
money that you diverted away from him. . . . He is the victim. . . . You’ve done 
a significant amount of harm financially to your father.” R979, 982. 
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victim for all losses caused by the defendant.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 
(West 2018) (emphasis added).  
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the State asks this Court to affirm. 
 Respectfully submitted on February 8, 2019. 
  SEAN D. REYES 
  Utah Attorney General 
 
Nathan D. Anderson 
  NATHAN D. ANDERSON 
  Assistant Solicitor General 
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